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PRIDE AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Jeremy Fischer 
Abstract 
Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the 
object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object 
of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or 
excellence of the object of one’s pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument 
provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which 
the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one’s relation to the object of 
pride indicates that one’s life accords with some of one’s personal ideals. I conclude that 
the pride relation, though distinct from the relation of moral responsibility, is nonetheless a 
relation of philosophical interest that merits further attention.1  
 
… the objects which excite these passions [pride and humility], are very numerous, and 
seemingly very different from each other. Pride or self-esteem may arise from the qualities 
of the mind; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, integrity: from those of the body; beauty, 
strength, agility, good mien, address in dancing, riding, fencing: from external advantages; 
country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths. [I] 
afterwards proceed to find out that common circumstance, in which all these objects agree, 
and which causes them to operate on the passions. 
 —David Hume2 
 
1. Introduction 
Hume brought to light two important features of the emotion of pride. First, people take pride 
in an enormous variety of objects, including achievements, family, material possessions, 
reputation, and physical appearance. Call this feature pride’s heterogeneity. Second, like guilt 
                                                
1 For very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper I would like to thank Angela Smith, William 
Talbott, Ingra Schellenberg, David Keyt, Rachel Fredericks, Sarah Buss, Noa Latham, Krista Thomason, 
Rebecca Stangl, and the anonymous referee for Ratio. I am also grateful to the audience members of colloquia at 
the University of Calgary, the University of Alabama in Huntsville, and the 2014 Meeting of the Pacific Division 
of the American Philosophical Association. 
2 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 659-660. 
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and fear but unlike contempt and admiration, experiencing the emotion of pride requires that 
we view ourselves as standing in some special relation to the object of our emotion. I might 
feel proud of my best friend or my grandparents, but it would be awfully strange for me to 
take pride in my best friend’s grandparents. Call this feature pride’s partiality.  
This article critically assesses one leading philosophical account of pride’s partiality. 
According to the agency account of the partiality relation, the self and the object of pride are 
suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the 
object of one’s pride.3 Robert Solomon characterizes his agency account of pride as follows: 
 
The key to the emotion of pride is that it is about our achievements in the world. “False 
pride” grossly overestimates those achievements, or perhaps even takes credit for 
something that is not our doing at all. (A person who has taken steps to make himself 
beautiful or healthy may be proud of his appearance or his health. A person who simply is 
beautiful or healthy would only be grateful—or perhaps vain—the passive emotional 
partners of pride. Our frequent confusion of pride and vanity—our calling ourselves proud 
when in fact we are only vain—is clearly more than verbal slippage).4 
 
In Solomon’s view, we cannot even intelligibly attribute pride to a passive subject; rather, the 
passive analog to pride is vanity or gratitude. Solomon concludes that a defining feature of 
                                                
3 See Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981); Robert Solomon, The 
Passions (New York: Doubleday Press, 1976); Norvin Richards, Humility (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1992); Richard Taylor, Restoring Pride (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996); and Kristján 
Kristjánsson, Justifying Emotions: Pride and Jealousy (London: Routledge Press, 2002). 
4 Solomon, The Passions, p.345.  
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pride is that ‘One takes responsibility (in praise) for his own works’.5  
I shall argue that objects of pride need not be connected to one’s agency. In §2, I review a 
set of distinctions between three kinds of appropriateness conditions for attitudes that will 
make the subsequent discussion more perspicuous. In §3-§5, I articulate three versions of the 
agency account of pride that correspond to the three kinds of appropriateness discussed in §2, 
and I provide reasons to reject each account. These reasons also constitute a strong prima facie 
defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and the object of pride are 
suitably related just in case one’s relation to the object of pride indicates that one’s life 
accords with some of one’s personal ideals.6 This personal ideals account explains how 
something might be worthy of one’s pride even if one is not morally responsible for it, 
because living in accordance with worthy personal ideals does not always require the exercise 
of one’s agency. 
 
2. Attribution, Fittingness, and External Propriety 
One can evaluate attitudes in several ways. When it is said, for example, that one should not 
feel proud about something for which one does not bear moral responsibility, the claim being 
made might be that such pride is caused by or embodies false judgments about the scope of 
one’s accomplishments or about the nature of personal merit, and so is epistemically 
objectionable; or, that feeling such pride leads one to rest on one’s laurels, and so is 
prudentially bad; or, that such pride is morally blameworthy insofar as it is a form of ‘taking 
                                                
5 Solomon, The Passions, p.346. 
6 For further discussion and defence of this alternate account, see my article, ‘Being Proud and Feeling 
Proud: Character, Emotion, and the Moral Psychology of Personal Ideals’, Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2012), 
pp. 209-222. 
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credit’ from another. Alternately, as Solomon asserts, the claim may be construed in terms of 
the ‘should’ of intelligibility, that pride taken in the accomplishments of others would be 
unintelligible.  
Let us distinguish, then, between the conditions under which a token emotion (1) is 
intelligibly attributable to a person (attribution conditions), (2) accurately presents its 
intentional object (fittingness conditions), and (3) is morally or prudentially good (external 
propriety conditions). By setting forth the conditions under which a token emotion is 
intelligibly attributed to a person, a set of attribution conditions defines a type of emotion, 
since it provides the conditions under which a token emotion is a token of some type of 
emotion. Attribution conditions supply the answer to the question of what makes your fear of 
spiders fear rather than an instance of some other type of mental state, such as disgust or 
hatred. One plausible attribution condition for S’s fear of x is that S takes x to pose a threat to 
herself. Fittingness conditions, on the other hand, are conditions under which a token emotion 
accurately represents its intentional object. One plausible fittingness condition for S’s fear of x 
is that x poses a threat to S. So, if S does not take x to pose a threat to herself, then S does not 
experience fear; and if S mistakenly takes x to pose a threat to herself (and if all other 
attribution conditions for fear are satisfied), then S’s fear is unfitting. 
Whether some emotion is fitting is logically independent of whether experiencing it is in 
some respect good. External propriety conditions provide conditions under which a token 
emotion is in some way (say, morally or prudentially), and in some of set of circumstances, a 
good attitude to have. Fear of public speaking may be prudentially bad regardless of whether 
it is fitting, insofar as it interferes with one’s ability to make an effective public presentation. 
Likewise, a hypocrite who holds another in contempt for behavior that he also engages in 
might be morally blameworthy for his hypocritical contempt, even if this attitude is fitting. So, 
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I assume in this paper that external propriety conditions bear on the question of whether an 
attitude is in some way good to have, whereas fittingness conditions bear on a different 
question that concerns the content of an attitude.7 
 
3. The Agency Account of Pride’s Attribution Conditions 
The promising idea that objects of pride are specially connected to one’s agency can be 
developed into an account of some of pride’s attribution conditions, fittingness conditions, or 
external propriety conditions. I begin by considering attribution conditions.  
Like Solomon, Kristján Kristjánsson defends the claim that an emotion is not intelligible as 
pride in the absence of the subject’s belief that he is to some extent morally responsible for the 
object of his pride. He offers the following case to support his claim: 
 
The fan who has cheered the team on to victory, bought tickets to its matches and so forth, 
can of course unproblematically feel proud of the team’s success, and prideful with respect 
to the recognition it gets. But what about the only person on a desert island who suddenly 
decides to become a fan of the San Francisco Forty-Niners football team, without ever 
having shown an interest in the team before, and subsequently, upon hearing via transistor 
radio about the team’s victories, claims to feel proud? What grounds do we have for saying 
that this person is experiencing the emotion of pride as distinct from simply that of joy? 
None, it seems to me—the person is surely better described as joyful than proud—for the 
kind of group membership required for taking pride in the group’s successes cannot be 
claimed simply on a whim. It must require some minimal effort, some minimal 
                                                
7 See Pamela Hieronymi, ‘The Wrong Kind of Reason’, Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005), pp. 437-457. 
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participation—that is, some responsibility, however small and partial.8 
 
Kristjánsson claims that without the activity required for moral responsibility there are no 
grounds for attributing pride rather than joy to a person, just as, to return to a previous 
example, there would be no grounds for attributing fear rather than disgust to a person who 
does not take the spider before him to pose a threat. According to Solomon and Kristjánsson, 
then, we are often mistaken not only in our assessments of who is worthy of pride but also in 
our attributions of pride.9  
Before assessing this account, I should specify the relevant notion of moral responsibility 
that I take agency accounts of all kinds to invoke: namely, that for a person to be morally 
responsible for something is, among other things, for her to be related to that thing in such a 
way as to make her an appropriate target, in principle, of moral praise or blame for it.10 The 
arguments in this paper do not attribute to agency accounts any particular account of the 
conditions under which a person stands in such a relation to something. Rather, the present 
                                                
8 Kristjánsson, Justifying Emotions, p.125; see also p.104. 
9 In such a spirit, former New York State Governor Mario Cuomo denied that he was proud of his son’s re-
election as Governor of New York: ‘ “There’s relief, great relief for his mother and his family, including 
myself,” he said. “There is not pride. People keep insisting that you must be proud. It’s not so much proud. I 
think gratitude is a better word. We’re grateful for the good luck that gave us the opportunity to serve, the good 
luck that gave Andrew all the wonderful gifts he was born with — a good mind, a strong body — and we were 
lucky he’s made the most of that good luck” ’. Danny Hakim, ‘A Father Looks On Not With Pride, but With 
Gratitude’, New York Times, 2 January 2011, A19. 
10 See Angela M. Smith, ‘Responsibility as Answerability’, Inquiry 58 (2015), pp.99-126; and T.M. Scanlon, 
What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). The clause, ‘in principle’, allows 
that one might be morally responsible for something even if there is not in fact anybody with proper standing to 
praise or blame one for that thing. 
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discussion merely assumes that moral responsibility is whatever relation that must hold 
between a person and something for it to be appropriate, in principle, to praise or blame her 
for that thing. 
According to agency accounts of pride’s attribution conditions, pride is an emotion of self-
praise and, so, an emotion that one has only when one takes oneself to be morally responsible 
for the object of pride.11 This account has considerable intuitive appeal, but it runs counter to 
common linguistic and interpretive conventions regarding pride. As a result of this 
revisionism, accepting the account requires that we adopt a theory of error in order to explain 
widespread misattributions of pride. In general, when a person, S, sincerely misattributes an 
attitude, φ, to a person, T, one of the following claims must be true: either S falsely judges that 
T satisfies the actual attribution conditions for φ, or S mistakenly identifies the attribution 
conditions for φ (perhaps by conflating the attribution conditions for φ with those for a 
                                                
11 An anonymous reviewer has suggested that the conditions of moral responsibility may differ for praise 
and blame—or, alternately, that praise might not presupposes the target agent’s moral responsibility at all. Thus, 
since defenders of agency accounts are best understood as claiming that the emotion of pride is a form of self-
praise, it is misleading to define these accounts in terms of a notion, moral responsibility, which may turn out to 
be irrelevant to praise. Alternatively, if there are varieties of responsibility in addition to the sort that agency 
accounts typically presuppose (differentiated perhaps by their respective kinds of objects, such as actions or 
persons), then the failure of agency accounts would not entail that pride presupposes no form of responsibility. I 
agree that agency accounts are best understood as entailing that pride is an emotion of self-praise. However, it 
follows from the characterization of moral responsibility in the body of the text, which I cannot here defend, that, 
so long as there is some relation between the agent and what she is praised for that is required in order to render 
praise appropriate in principle, praise must presuppose moral responsibility. Thus, praise-based accounts of 
pride’s partiality must be defined in terms of moral responsibility. As to the truth-conditions of claims about 
moral responsibility and whether these truth-conditions are symmetrical in claims about praise and blame, I 
remain agnostic.  
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different attitude, φ) and takes T to satisfy those mistakenly identified attribution conditions. 
Instances of self-attribution, such as those cited by Solomon and Kristjánsson, are special 
cases in which S and T refer to the same person. So, agency theorists face the following 
dilemma: 
 
(1) If taking pride in something requires self-attributions of agency, then sincerely claiming 
to experience pride in something that does not in fact implicate one’s agency always 
involves either:  
(a)  making the false judgment that one’s agency is implicated, or 
(b) profound linguistic or conceptual confusion about pride (perhaps by 
mischaracterizing joy or gratitude as pride). 
 
There is no third alternative for the agency-based theorist. I shall argue that implementing the 
requisite error theory for the agency account of attribution is less plausible than rejecting the 
account altogether. That is to say, Solomon’s and Kristjánsson’s modus ponens is my modus 
tollens. Since all agency-based attribution accounts must make recourse to such an error 
theory, an argument against the latter constitutes an argument against the former.  
Taking the first horn of the dilemma requires making extremely uncharitable belief 
attributions. It would be uncharitable to attribute to one who is proud to be an American, say, 
the judgment that one’s agency is implicated in one’s being an American (at least among 
natural born citizens).12 Not all proud Americans take themselves to be morally responsible 
for their being Americans. Likewise, taking pride in one’s rugged good looks does not seem to 
                                                
12 Recall the following quip, sometimes attributed to G. B. Shaw: ‘patriotism is the conviction that your 
country is superior to all others because you were born in it’. 
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require taking oneself to be morally responsible for one’s natural physical qualities. So, 
sincerely claiming to experience pride in something that does not in fact implicate one’s 
agency does not typically involve making the false judgment that one’s agency is implicated. 
Taking the second horn of the dilemma requires regarding people who claim to feel 
agency-free pride as failing to understand at a basic level the meaning or proper extension of 
the concept of pride. Solomon and Kristjánsson embrace this result and declare that such 
people mistakenly describe joy or gratitude as pride. Thus, they defend their account of 
pride’s partiality by denying pride’s heterogeneity. However, unless there are strong 
independent grounds for accepting the agency view, such a revisionary conclusion must be 
avoided. For a core constraint on any account of an emotion is to save the phenomena of our 
mental life and of our ways of talking about that life. After all, these phenomena make up a 
large share of the very data needed for constructing such an account. So, if there is an 
established practice of recognizing certain emotions as pride, then we should be wary of 
countering it on the basis of the (albeit antecedently plausible) intuition that feeling pride 
towards something requires taking oneself to be morally responsible for it.13 No compelling 
grounds have been presented for revising our linguistic and interpretive conventions in the 
proposed manner, and I see no prospect of finding any such grounds without begging the 
question against those who reject the agency account. I conclude that  
 
 
                                                
13 This point relates to the general danger of the ‘moralization’ of our psychology by means of interpreting 
mental states and capacities so as to maximize their conformity with moral judgments of which we are 
antecedently confident. See John Deigh, ‘Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique’, Ethics 93 (1983), pp.225-245; 
and Bernard Williams, ‘Nietzsche’s minimalist moral psychology’, in Making sense of humanity and other 
philosophical papers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
  10 
(2) Sincerely claiming to experience pride in something that does not in fact implicate 
one’s agency does not always involve either:  
(a) making the false judgment that one’s agency is implicated, or  
(b) profound linguistic or conceptual confusion about pride (perhaps by 
mischaracterizing joy or gratitude as pride); 
 
and, so, 
 
(3) Taking pride in something does not require self-attributions of agency.  
 
In defence of the agency account, one might appeal to a conception of group agency in 
order to render vicarious pride and group pride intelligible. The sports fan who has 
contributed some effort, say by cheering the team on to victory, might thereby regard herself 
as having earned membership to the team and an intelligible relation to the object of her pride. 
Kristjánsson suggests that this membership relation may establish some degree of derivative 
individual moral responsibility for the present and future (and, perhaps, the past) activity of 
the group. I conclude this section with three reasons to believe that this proposal can offer 
only limited support for agency accounts.  
First, it is plausible that collective emotions and their corresponding individual emotions 
are different types of emotions. For instance, whereas collective guilt plausibly takes a group 
as its intentional object, individual guilt is about the self.14 So, an account of an individual 
emotion should not be assimilated to an account of the corresponding collective emotion 
                                                
14 See Deborah Tollefsen, ‘The Rationality of Collective Guilt’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (2006), 
pp. 222-239. 
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without further argumentation. Since the present paper concerns individual pride, care must be 
taken in introducing the notion of group agency to ensure that we are not changing the subject. 
Second, the group agency defence of the agency account fails to render intelligible instances 
of pride in one’s gifts or natural attributes. Thus, even if this proposal succeeds in explaining 
pride in one’s country, say, it still fails to explain the very possibility of pride in one’s natural 
beauty, agility, or good memory. Third, agency accounts of group pride entail the same prima 
facie implausible denial of pride’s heterogeneity at the group level as we have seen agency 
accounts of individual pride entail at the individual level. By all appearances, a nation may 
intelligibly take pride in the natural beauty of its environment or in the natural athleticism of 
its individual members. So, the claim that groups may only intelligibly take pride in what they 
are morally responsible for is highly revisionary and prima facie implausible. Thus, 
introducing the notion of group agency fails to deflect the charge that agency accounts of 
pride’s attribution conditions implausibly deny pride’s heterogeneity. 
 
4. The Agency Account of Pride’s Fittingness Conditions 
In rejecting agency accounts of attribution, I agree with Sidgwick, who allows that one might 
not be morally responsible for objects of one’s pride. However, Sidgwick condemns such 
pride on grounds of fittingness: ‘As for such pride and self-satisfaction as are based not on our 
own conduct and its results, but on external and accidental advantages, these are condemned 
as involving a false and absurd view as to the nature of real merit’.15 Norvin Richards has 
recently defended an agency-based fittingness condition combined with a credit-based 
attribution condition for pride, according to which experiencing pride about something 
requires taking that thing to be to one’s credit, broadly construed. According to Richards, a 
                                                
15 Sidgwick, Methods, p.336. 
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person who takes pride in things that are not his doing judges that the relevant sort of credit 
does not require the exercise of agency. Richards agrees with Sidgwick that this judgment is 
mistaken: 
 
[T]o be proud of something is not the same as simply taking pleasure in it. You might take 
pleasure in the lovely view from a secluded hillside, for example, taking every opportunity 
to visit and enjoy it, without being at all proud of the view .… One reason to think it is 
wrong to be proud of what is not at all your doing is that such things are very like the view 
from the hillside, in an important respect. In both cases, you are only a beneficiary of some 
good thing; you have nothing more to do with it than that. That is what makes it so odd to 
be proud of the view from the hillside, I think: you are only in the right place at the right 
time for this to fall into your lap. If so, the same should apply to being proud of anything 
that you received only by chance. If your talent or your ancestry or your wealth came your 
way only by the luck of the draw, it would be equally inappropriate to be proud of them.16  
 
Richards suggests that, with respect to the attitude of pride, we should regard all qualities for 
which we are not morally responsible as having fallen into our lap, as matters of mere chance. 
If such qualities are valuable, then we should at most regard ourselves as beneficiaries of 
them. So, for instance, matters relating to one’s ethnicity, nationality, and ancestry in which 
one might take pride should be regarded, instead, as being on par with winning the lottery.  
The Sidgwickian view according to which it is unfitting to take pride in what does not 
directly reflect one’s worth as an agent has its roots, I believe, in the idea that human agency 
is the only significant measure of a person’s life—the only sort of quality worth taking pride 
                                                
16 Richards, Humility, p. 202; p.204. 
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in. On this view, no progress can be made toward living in accordance with worthy personal 
ideals without personal activity.  
There is a profound split in our thinking on this matter. On the one hand, there is 
considerable force to the intuition that what makes something attributable to a person, in the 
sense of forming a reasonable basis for our evaluation of her, is that it reflects some aspect of 
her agency. It is unreasonable to praise a person for something, such as winning the lottery, 
that she had no active part in. Where we do praise someone for something apart from his or 
her agency, say for the luster of his or her hair, we are willing to acknowledge that such 
features are superficial. Thus there is theoretical pressure to accept that the evaluable person is 
nothing more than the agent and that, as a result, it is unfitting to take pride in what does not 
depend upon or reflect one’s agency. 
On the other hand, much of what we take pride in, which is also much of what appears to 
make one’s life meaningful by giving one a ‘sense of self’, does not depend on one’s agency. 
The first-personal point of view seems to confirm that some of what is worthy of pride lies 
beyond our agency, and beyond the realm of that for which one may deserve moral praise. In 
what follows I suggest that such pride might reflect, not an absurd view as to the nature of real 
merit, but rather a different conception of pride, one that rejects the agency account’s 
assimilation of pride to the judgment of praiseworthiness.17 Richards’s argument, I claim, 
begs the question against this different conception of pride. 
Consider the following lyric from the autobiographical Dolly Parton song, ‘Coat of Many 
Colors’: 
                                                
17 For a full defence of this suggestion, see my unpublished manuscript, ‘Self-Evaluation and Social 
Practices’. For a similar view of the emotion of shame, see Cheshire Calhoun, ‘An Apology for Moral Shame’, 
The Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2004), pp.127-146.  
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There were rags of many colors and every piece was small 
And I didn't have a coat and it was way down in the fall. 
Momma sewed the rags together sewin’ every piece with love. 
She made my coat of many colors that I was so proud of… 
My coat of many colors that my momma made for me 
Made only from rags but I wore it so proudly.18 
 
It would be a mistake to interpret Parton as claiming moral responsibility for the coat of many 
colors and it would be obtuse to claim that Parton’s pride is unfitting on the grounds that she 
lacks moral responsibility for the coat. Likewise, we have little reason to reinterpret Parton’s 
invocation of pride merely as a defensive refusal to be ashamed of her coat. For this lyric 
surely describes some emotion that Parton experienced towards her coat, and we may as well 
follow her interpretation and understand that emotion to be pride. Rather, Parton’s pride in her 
coat appears to embody her judgment that, among other things, she is secure in the love of her 
generous and talented mother. In experiencing pride, Parton values herself as a person who 
enjoys such a relationship. Her coat of many colors is evidence that her life accords with this 
personally important value. 
Consider, further, the following passage from James Baldwin’s Giovanni’s Room, which 
describes an American ex-pat living in Paris in the 1950s, who cannot help but take pride as 
an American, even though he is deeply ambivalent about his home country: 
 
When Giovanni wanted me to know that he was displeased with me, he said I was a ‘vrai 
                                                
18 Dolly Parton, ‘Coat of Many Colors’, Coat of Many Colors (RCA Nashville, 1971).  
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americain’; conversely, when delighted, he said that I was not an American at all; and on 
both occasions he was striking, deep in me, a nerve which did not throb in him. And I 
resented this: resented being called an American (and resented resenting it) because it 
seemed to make me nothing more than that, whatever that was; and I resented being called 
not an American because it seemed to make me nothing.19 
 
This character sees himself as inextricably American in the sense that when stripped of this 
identification ‘it seemed to make me nothing’. His identification as an American is an 
essential part of his particular identity. It is a self-conception under which he values himself. 
Some of his personal ideals make ineliminable reference to his being an American, which is to 
say, a good American. Our commitments to reduced-agency personal ideals, like the ideals of 
having talented and loving parents or being a ‘real American’, partially constitute our 
identities as the particular persons that we are. These personal ideals are properly called 
‘reduced-agency’ because while they sometimes call for activity, it is also possible on 
occasion to be in accordance with them without having to do anything. So, even if the 
exercise of one’s agency were required in order for one to have an American identity in the 
first place, it may still be possible to take sensible pride in, say, the victories of the U.S. 
Olympic hockey team, even supposing that such victories were removed from one’s agency. 
These victories would be like Parton’s coat, tokens that indicate that one’s life accords with 
personal values that are central to one’s identity. Such pride need not reflect an absurd view 
about merit.  
One might object that, tragically perhaps, it is possible for a worthless personal ideal to 
figure centrally in one’s identity as the particular person one is. If so, the fact that one takes 
                                                
19 James Baldwin, Giovanni’s Room [1956] (New York: Random House, 2000), p.89. 
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pride in being an American does not entail that the ideal of being an American is worthy. 
Likewise, Dolly Parton’s heart-warming song does not establish immunity against Sidgwick’s 
charge that pride in gifts presupposes an absurd view about merit. Even so, values that help to 
structure one’s identity and attune oneself to the world play no small role in making one’s life 
worthwhile. As such, these values may be worthy of our commitment and far from absurd. 
The important point is that one’s commitments to such personal ideals are integral to one’s 
identity as the particular person that one is and, so, taking pride in some external good like 
one’s ancestry or one’s nation of birth is disanalogous to taking pride in winning the lottery or 
the view from the hillside. Pride in one’s family, say, may be an affirmation of the importance 
to one’s identity of narratives involving one’s family members. Pride in the view from the 
hillside, on the other hand, is difficult to imagine as being fitting insofar as it is difficult to 
imagine the person whose identity as the particular person that she is involves this view.20  
Although the Sidgwickian claim is not implausible, we are now in a position to see that we 
have good reason to reject Richards’s argument for it. Much of what one finds meaningful and 
worthy of pride is indeed the result of chance, in what we may call ‘chance’ in an impersonal 
sense of the term. My parents could have raised their child to have a different ethnicity, 
nationality, and perhaps gender. But from a first-personal point of view, these qualities are 
not, in my case at least, a matter of chance in what we may call the ethical sense of the term.21 
                                                
20 By ‘identity’, I refer to the phenomenon that has recently been well described by Bennett Helm, Love, 
Friendship, and the Self: Intimacy, Identification, and the Social Nature of Persons (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), at p.134. Defending this account of practical identity, which I cannot do here, would 
require defending the claim that one’s identity is reasons-responsive, though not necessarily deliberately or 
autonomously chosen, nor necessarily based upon what one is responsible for.  
21 See Thomas Nagel’s (1979) related discussion of ‘constitutive luck’ in ‘Moral Luck’, reprinted in his 
Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
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From my point of view these qualities partially consitute my practical identity, so that, 
without them, I would be an ethically (if not metaphysically) different person. Many qualities 
for which I lack moral responsibility, for instance that I was raised to have a masculine 
identity and that I care about the ancestors or cultural works that I care about, are necessary 
features of my identity as the particular person who I am.22 That is to say, from the point of 
view of the proud family member or citizen herself, the significance of such features is not on 
par with the significance of winning a lottery or the significance of the beautiful view from 
the hillside.23 That I have been raised to appreciate and identify with my family, for instance, 
is not a matter of chance from my point of view—in the way that winning the lottery would 
be—because I can easily imagine myself never winning the lottery, though I cannot imagine 
myself with a different family. 
So, among the qualities of a person for which she is not morally responsible, some may be 
more significant and worthy of pride than others to her. Significance of this sort is limited 
neither to what one is morally responsible for, nor to what is to one’s credit. Richards’s 
argument begs the question against this view, since he assumes that the sense in which one’s 
family would be worthy of pride is identical to the sense in which some view from a hillside 
would be to one’s credit. With practical identity-related qualities on the table, we are in a 
position to see that there is room for a view according to which some objectively randomly 
distributed qualities (e.g., one’s ethnicity) and not others (e.g., winning the lottery) might 
merit pride. 
                                                
22 See Anthony Appiah, ‘ “But Would That Still Be Me?” Notes on Gender, “Race,” Ethnicity, as Sources of 
“Identity” ’, The Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990), pp.493-499. 
23 Likewise, we may agree, without accepting Kristjánsson’s conclusion, that Kristjánsson’s desert island fan 
(who ‘suddenly decides to become a fan … simply on a whim’ [emphasis added]) does not feel pride. 
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One might object that gratitude or simple pleasure would be a more fitting response than 
pride to these significant qualities. This is not necessarily so, though the defence of this claim 
would require discussion of those attitudes, which I cannot provide here. However, we can 
note that fitting gratitude is always a response to benevolence, though fitting pride need not be 
so.24 One might be proud of one’s friend having overcome a hardship without regarding him 
as having done so benevolently, and Americans might be proud of Buzz Aldrin without 
regarding the Apollo 11 mission as benevolent. On the other hand, simple pleasure, unlike 
pride, is plausibly never unfitting; nor can simple pleasure represent the significance to one’s 
self-conception of the qualities under discussion.  
 
5. The Agency Account of Pride’s External Propriety Conditions 
Even if we have no reason to believe that fitting pride requires the exercise of one’s agency, 
the question remains as to whether experiencing such pride is ever externally appropriate. For 
example, if it were true that agency-free pride, even when fitting, led one to rest on one’s 
laurels, then there might be a prudential external propriety condition according to which 
agency-free pride is unjustified. Such pride would be unjustified not in the sense of 
misrepresenting something but in the sense of leading to bad consequences for the agent 
herself. Whether such a prudential condition exists must be determined by empirical study.  
Whether there exists a moral external propriety condition against agency-free pride is a 
more philosophically tractable question. If there is such a condition, and if the conclusions of 
the preceding sections are correct, then even tokens of fitting pride may be morally 
inappropriate.  
A moral propriety condition of moral responsibility would render morally inappropriate 
                                                
24 See Fred Berger, ‘Gratitude’, Ethics 85 (1975), pp. 298-309. 
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instances of pride, such as pride in winning a game of Bingo, that do not offend anyone. I 
submit that there is no reason to be morally offended by such trivial pride. Moreover, even if 
the experience of trivial pride manifested some human failing, such a proud person would not 
owe it to us as a matter of respect for our humanity to remedy this failing. At most they would 
owe us the courtesy of refraining from expressing their emotion, so as not to arouse our 
annoyance or envy. So, I tentatively conclude that we do not in general owe to others either 
lack of pride about external goods or lack of concern about personal ideals that do not require 
agency to be satisfied.  
What we find morally offensive in some cases of agency-free pride—and legitimately so—
is a sense of entitlement. Some obnoxiously proud people take themselves to be entitled to 
praise from others, for instance, as when a proud family member brags about their ancestor’s 
achievements. However, these faults are independent of the emotion of pride, and are better 
located as expressions of vicious character traits or of offensive beliefs about social hierarchy.  
 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that moral responsibility is not a necessary condition of pride’s attribution, 
fittingness, or moral external propriety. Agency accounts are based on the plausible intuition 
that pride is in some way closely related to moral responsibility. If the arguments of this paper 
are sound, however, then how to make sense of this intuition remains an open question. I 
suggested in §4 that personal ideals are central to pride. If this claim is correct, then we may 
get a handle on the question of the relation of agency to the attitude of pride by answering the 
following first-order normative question: to what extent and in what ways is the exercise of 
one’s agency necessary for one’s life to accord with worthy personal ideals? 
Finally, I hope to have shown that pride’s partiality relation, though distinct from the 
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relation of moral responsibility, is nonetheless a relation of philosophical interest which merits 
further attention. I have challenged the view that human agency is the only sort of quality that 
is, ultimately, worth taking pride in. Thus, in addition to illuminating pride and other partial 
emotions like shame, this conclusion illuminates the values that these partial emotions are 
about, insofar as it helps us to understand the qualities that make anything, including one’s 
entire life, worthy of pride. 
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